The Strategy of Conflict Summary

Thomas Schelling explains conflict as a process of bargaining rather than simply a physical contest in which one side destroys the other. Countries, organizations and individuals often have both conflicting and shared interests. Even enemies may wish to avoid total destruction, control escalation or reach an agreement. Schelling uses ideas from game theory to explain threats, promises, deterrence, credibility and strategic commitment. A threat is useful only when the opponent believes it may actually be carried out. Sometimes a negotiator can strengthen his position by deliberately limiting his own freedom to retreat. The book became especially influential in understanding nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, where total victory could mean mutual destruction. Its broader lesson is that power does not consist only of possessing weapons; it also involves influencing an opponent’s expectations, choices and calculations.

1. Conflict is often a bargaining relationship in which both sides try to influence each other’s decisions.

1. Opponents may have a common interest in avoiding unlimited destruction.

1. Deterrence means persuading an opponent not to act by threatening unacceptable consequences.

1. A threat must be credible; an unbelievable threat cannot influence rational behaviour.

1. Commitment means limiting one’s future choices to convince the other side that one will not retreat.

1. A bargaining position may become stronger when a party can demonstrate that making further concessions is impossible.

1. A focal point is an outcome that people select because it appears natural, prominent or commonly understandable.

1. Communication may occur through military movements, public statements and visible preparations as well as formal negotiations.

1. In nuclear strategy, the purpose of military capability may be to prevent war rather than to fight and win a traditional war.

1. Important quotation: “Rationality is a collection of attributes.” The line reminds readers that people and governments may be rational in some respects but mistaken, emotional or inconsistent in others.