6. History of Pakistan (1947–to date): Early Challenges and Constitutional Development

Why This Topic Matters

This topic does two things at once: it explains the extraordinary difficulty of building a functioning state from nothing in 1947, and it traces the search for a stable constitutional order that Pakistan has pursued, with repeated interruption, ever since. Every later topic in this subject — military intervention (Topic 7), the loss of East Pakistan (Topic 8), the quality of democracy (Topic 9), and even foreign policy (Topic 10) — is easier to explain once the constitutional and institutional starting conditions described here are understood clearly.

The State-Building Crisis of 1947

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947 facing a set of simultaneous emergencies that a more gradual transfer of power might have allowed a new state to address one at a time. Refugee movement in both directions across the new Punjab and Bengal borders (introduced in Topic 5) placed enormous strain on a government that did not yet have functioning administrative machinery in many areas — Pakistan inherited a substantially smaller share of the trained bureaucratic, military and technical personnel of undivided British India than its share of population and territory would have suggested, since many of the most experienced administrative cadres, and the bulk of undivided India’s existing military production and financial institutions, were concentrated in what became India. Disputes over the physical division of financial assets (including the share of the undivided government’s cash balances owed to Pakistan, famously requiring Gandhi’s personal intervention and a fast to press the Indian government to release funds it was initially withholding) and of military stores and equipment further complicated the first months of the new state’s existence.

Kashmir: An Immediate and Enduring Security Question

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir occupied a uniquely difficult position at independence: it had a Muslim-majority population but was ruled by a Hindu maharaja, Hari Singh, who initially sought to remain independent of both new dominions. Following incursions by tribal fighters from Pakistan’s frontier regions in October 1947, Hari Singh acceded to India in exchange for military assistance, a decision Pakistan has long disputed on the grounds that it did not reflect the wishes of the state’s Muslim-majority population. The resulting first India-Pakistan war (1947–48) ended with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire in January 1949, establishing a ceasefire line that divided the state into Indian- and Pakistani-administered portions — a division that has persisted, with periodic further conflict, ever since, and that reappears directly in Topic 10’s account of Pakistan’s foreign policy and security orientation. Kashmir should be understood from the outset as one of the two or three most consequential unresolved legacies of partition, not as a peripheral or merely diplomatic issue.

Leadership and Institutional Fragility

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the founding Governor-General, set an important early tone in his 11 August 1947 address to the Constituent Assembly, in which he spoke of equal citizenship for all communities regardless of religion — a statement whose relationship to the eventual constitutional character of the state (discussed below) has itself become a subject of extensive later debate. Jinnah’s death on 11 September 1948, barely a year after independence, removed the single most authoritative figure in the new state’s politics at an early and formative moment. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in October 1951 removed a second central leader in similarly short order. The loss of both founding leaders so early — combined with the fact that political parties and parliamentary conventions remained far less institutionally developed than the permanent civil bureaucracy and the military, both of which had inherited well-established colonial-era organisational structures and professional cadres — created a persistent imbalance between weak elected political institutions and comparatively strong, well-organised unelected state institutions. This imbalance is one of the most important explanatory threads running through the rest of Pakistan’s constitutional and political history, and it connects directly to the analysis of military intervention in Topic 7.

Constitution-Making: Why It Took Nine Years

The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 under Liaquat Ali Khan’s leadership, laid down the guiding principles for Pakistan’s future constitution: sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah alone, and the authority delegated to the state of Pakistan is to be exercised through its people within limits prescribed by Him, while the resolution simultaneously guaranteed fundamental rights, minority rights, and an independent judiciary. It represented an attempt to reconcile an explicitly Islamic constitutional identity with liberal-democratic constitutional forms, and it was adopted with some non-Muslim members of the Assembly voting against or abstaining, on the grounds that its language was insufficiently precise about how Islamic principles and equal citizenship for non-Muslims would in practice be reconciled — a tension that has recurred, in various forms, throughout subsequent constitutional history rather than being resolved once and for all in 1949.

Actual constitution-making, however, took far longer than the Objectives Resolution’s adoption might suggest — the first constitution was not completed until 1956, nine years after independence. The central obstacle was the unresolved question of representation between Pakistan’s two wings: East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) contained a clear majority of the new state’s total population, but political and military leadership was concentrated overwhelmingly in West Pakistan. Any constitutional formula based on straightforward population-based representation would have given East Pakistan a permanent majority in the national legislature — an outcome West Pakistani political and military leadership was reluctant to accept. The eventual solution, incorporated into the 1956 Constitution, was parity: West Pakistan’s several provinces were merged into a single administrative unit (the “One Unit” scheme) so that West and East Pakistan could be treated as two equal halves for representation purposes, each holding an equal number of national assembly seats regardless of the population difference between them. This resolved the immediate constitutional deadlock but created a deep and lasting East Pakistani grievance about unequal treatment of the wing with the larger population — a grievance that runs directly, and heavily, into the causes of the 1971 crisis analysed in Topic 8.

The 1956 and 1962 Constitutions

The 1956 Constitution established Pakistan as a parliamentary federal republic (formally, the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan”), incorporating the Objectives Resolution as a preamble and providing for a bicameral-in-effect parity arrangement between the two wings under the One Unit scheme. It survived barely two years: President Iskander Mirza abrogated it in October 1958, and General Ayub Khan’s subsequent assumption of full power (Topic 7) ended Pakistan’s first, brief experiment with a working constitution before it had produced a single completed general election under its own terms.

The 1962 Constitution, introduced by Ayub Khan, replaced the parliamentary system with a presidential system, under which the president was elected indirectly through an electoral college of “Basic Democrats” (locally elected councillors) rather than by direct popular vote, and executive authority was concentrated heavily in the presidency rather than a cabinet responsible to a directly elected legislature. This system is examined more closely, alongside Ayub Khan’s broader rule, in Topic 7.

The 1973 Constitution: Pakistan’s Enduring Framework

Following the trauma of the 1971 crisis and the loss of East Pakistan (Topic 8), an elected Constituent Assembly under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto produced the 1973 Constitution, which restored a federal parliamentary system — executive authority resting with a prime minister responsible to a directly elected National Assembly, with the president serving a largely ceremonial role (subject to important later amendments discussed below). The 1973 Constitution was passed with an unusually broad degree of political consensus for its time and remains, in amended form, Pakistan’s basic constitutional document to this day — a point of real institutional continuity worth emphasising, since so much of the surrounding political history has been marked by rupture rather than continuity.

Amendments and the Changing Institutional Balance

Reading the 1973 Constitution’s amendment history is really reading a history of the shifting balance between president and prime minister, between the centre and the provinces, and between elected institutions and other organs of the state:

• The Eighth Amendment (1985), passed during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (Topic 7), inserted Article 58(2)(b), granting the president the power to dissolve the National Assembly (and, with it, dismiss the government) under specified circumstances — a power subsequently used to dismiss several elected governments during the 1988–1999 period discussed in Topic 9.
• The Thirteenth Amendment (1997), passed under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, repealed the president’s Article 58(2)(b) dissolution power, restoring stronger parliamentary supremacy relative to the presidency.
• The Seventeenth Amendment (2003), passed during General Pervez Musharraf’s rule (Topic 7), restored a version of presidential dissolution power and provided constitutional cover for several actions taken during Musharraf’s earlier period of extra-constitutional rule.
• The Eighteenth Amendment (2010), passed under a coalition government following the 2008 election (Topic 9), is generally regarded as the most significant single amendment since 1973: it permanently removed the president’s discretionary dissolution power, substantially devolved authority from the federal government to the provinces (transferring a wide range of subjects previously on the concurrent legislative list to exclusive provincial control), renamed the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and revised the mechanisms for appointing judges and the Election Commission.
• More recently, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment Act, 2024 made substantial changes to judicial appointments and procedure — including reconstituting the Judicial Commission of Pakistan’s role in appointing judges, capping the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s tenure at three years, removing the Supreme Court’s suo motu (self-initiated) jurisdiction, and creating dedicated constitutional benches — alongside the insertion of a new fundamental right to a clean and sustainable environment (Article 9-A) and a provision on eliminating riba (interest) from the economy by 2028. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment Act, 2025, passed in November 2025 under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government, created a new Federal Constitutional Court, changed procedures for the transfer of judges, amended provisions relating to command of the armed forces, and revisited aspects of federal-provincial fiscal and administrative arrangements; the amendment was contested at the time of its passage, with opposition parties and a number of legal commentators arguing that it weakened provincial autonomy and judicial independence, while the governing coalition presented it as a modernisation of governance and national-security structures. As with any very recent legislative development, candidates should verify the current, precise text of these amendments from the official National Assembly record before an examination, since interpretation and even further amendment can follow quickly.

Key Terms and Concepts

• Objectives Resolution (1949): The Constituent Assembly’s statement of guiding constitutional principles, attempting to reconcile Islamic sovereignty language with fundamental rights and minority protection.
• One Unit scheme: The 1955 merger of West Pakistan’s provinces into a single administrative unit, enabling a “parity” formula of equal representation between West and East Pakistan despite their population difference.
• Parity: The principle, embedded in the 1956 Constitution, of treating West and East Pakistan as two equal halves for legislative representation regardless of population.
• Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan’s system of indirectly elected local councillors who, under the 1962 Constitution, formed the electoral college for the presidency.
• Article 58(2)(b): The Eighth Amendment provision (1985–1997, then 2003–2010) allowing presidential dissolution of the National Assembly, repeatedly added and removed as the civil-military and centre-presidency balance shifted.

Comparing Pakistan’s Three Constitutions

Preparation Toolkit

Preparation Checklist

• Build two parallel timelines: one tracking governments and political crises, and a separate one tracking constitutional documents and amendments. Keeping these separate prevents the common error of treating a change of government as a constitutional change, or vice versa.
• For each of the three constitutions, compare form of government, federal structure, legislature, executive, judiciary, Islamic provisions, and amendment process directly against each other.
• Treat the “why did constitution-making take nine years” question as a case study in the East-West representation problem specifically — this single issue explains most of the delay and connects directly to Topic 8.
• Keep an evidence bank: Jinnah’s death (1948), Objectives Resolution (1949), Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination (1951), One Unit scheme (1955), 1956 Constitution, 1958 abrogation, 1962 Constitution, 1973 Constitution, Eighth Amendment (1985), Thirteenth Amendment (1997), Seventeenth Amendment (2003), Eighteenth Amendment (2010), Twenty-Sixth Amendment (2024), Twenty-Seventh Amendment (2025).
• Practice one analytical outline answering: “Why did the parity formula, designed to solve Pakistan’s early constitutional deadlock, become one of the long-term causes of the 1971 crisis?”

Common Confusions to Avoid

• Do not mix constitution-making with ordinary changes of government; the state can change governments (through election, resignation, dismissal, or coup) without any change to the constitutional document itself, and vice versa.
• Do not describe the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions as minor variations of one another; they adopted significantly different executive arrangements (parliamentary, presidential, parliamentary again).
• Do not treat the parity formula as a minor technical arrangement; it directly reflects, and later deepened, the core East-West political tension that runs through this entire section of the syllabus.
• Do not rely on outdated notes for recent constitutional amendments (particularly the Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Amendments); verify current constitutional text from the official National Assembly record close to the date of any examination.

Easy Revision Points

• Muhammad Ali Jinnah became Pakistan’s first Governor-General and died on 11 September 1948; Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951.
• The Objectives Resolution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 and became a lasting constitutional reference point, later made a substantive part of the constitution through the Eighth Amendment (1985).
• Pakistan’s first constitution came into force in 1956, built around the parity formula and the One Unit scheme, and was abrogated after the 1958 military takeover.
• The 1962 Constitution created a presidential system under Ayub Khan, with the president elected through the indirect Basic Democracies system.
• The 1973 Constitution established a federal parliamentary system and remains the basic constitutional framework, though amended many times, including the Eighth (1985), Thirteenth (1997), Seventeenth (2003), Eighteenth (2010), Twenty-Sixth (2024) and Twenty-Seventh (2025) Amendments.
• Recent constitutional history should be verified from official legislative records rather than relying on older textbooks, since amendment activity has continued into 2025.

Key Takeaways

• Pakistan’s state-building crisis in 1947 (refugee movement, asset division, administrative shortages, and the immediate Kashmir dispute) occurred simultaneously with, and directly delayed, the process of constitution-making.
• The early loss of both Jinnah (1948) and Liaquat Ali Khan (1951) left political institutions comparatively weak relative to the more established civil bureaucracy and military — an imbalance that is essential background for Topic 7.
• The nine-year delay in producing a first constitution is best explained by the unresolved East-West representation problem, ultimately addressed (not solved) through the parity formula and One Unit scheme in the 1956 Constitution — an arrangement whose long-term political cost becomes clear in Topic 8.
• Pakistan’s three constitutions (1956, 1962, 1973) adopted substantially different executive models, and the 1973 Constitution’s long amendment history is best read as a continuing negotiation over the balance between president and prime minister, centre and provinces, and elected and unelected institutions.
• Very recent constitutional developments (the 2024 and 2025 amendments) should always be checked against current official sources, since this is an area where legislative change continues to occur close to, and potentially after, any given examination date.